THE AMERICAN
LAW REGISTER ANDREVIEW
PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

Advisory Comm ittee:
HAM1PTON L. CARSON, Chairman.
GEORGE TUCKER BISPHAM,

ERSKINE HAZARD DICKSON.

GEORGE STUART PATTERSON,
GEORGE WHARTON PEPPER,

WILLIAM STRUTHERS ELLIS.
-WILLIAM DRAPER LEWIS.

Editors:
ROY VILSON WIHITE, Fditor-in-Chief.
MEREDITH HANNA, Treasurer.

JOSEPH A. McKEON,

ROGER ASHHURST,
WILLIAM P. BEEBER,

H. W. MOORE,

WILLIAM C. JOHNSTON,
FRANCIS S. McILHENNY,

BERTRAM D. REARICK,
OWEN J. ROBERTS,

ARTHUR E. WEIL.
.SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $3.00 PER ANNUA.

SINGLE COPIES, 35 CENTS.

Address all literary communications to the EDITOR-IN-CHIEF ; all business com-

munications to the TRxASuo ni, Department of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
-Sixth and Chestnut Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.
TERMINATION OF OFFICE; PUBLIC OFFICER; ACCEPTANCE OF AN
INCOMPATIBLE OFFICE. The question of the termination of the

authority of a public officer by reason of his acceptance of an in,compatible office, has recently been passed upon by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in the case of Attorney- General ex relatione
.loreland v. Common Council of City of Detroit, 7o N. W. Rep.
450 (March 19, 1897). Pingree, mayor of Detroit, having been
elected governor of Michigan, attempted to exercise the functions
of both offices. The question as to his right to do so having come
before the court, it was held that the offices of mayor of a city and
governor of a State are incompatible, and cannot be occupied by
one and the same person at the same time, and Pingree, having.
accepted the office of governor, the office of mayor thereby became
vacant. This decision is in accordance with the common law rule
on the subject, that when the occupant of one office accepts another
incompatible with the first, he thereby vacates the first office, and
his title thereto is ip'so facto terminated without any further act on
his part, and without any judicial or other proceedings. While the
.rule.is.very clear, the application of it has been far from uniform,
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partly due to statutory provisions and partly due to different views
of judges as to what constitutes incompatibility. Thus, in New
York, a retired army officer may act as Aqueduct Commissioner:
People v. Duane, 121 N. Y. 367, 189o; while in Texas he may
not act as mayor of a city: Statev. DeGress, 53 Texas, 387 (i88o).
In Indiana an officer of volunteers may not act as Auditor of the
county: Mehringer v. State, 20 Ind. 103 (1863) ; while in Iowa
he may act as District Attorney: Bryan v. Cattell, 15 Iowa, 55o

(1864).
It is to be noted that the above rule applies to offices under the
same sovereignty and that, therefore, the acceptance of an office
existing under a State law, does not vacate an office existing under
a national law: Follz v. Kerlin, 105 Ind. 222 (1885) ; DeIurkv.
CoM., 129 P. S. I5I (1889). But if the incumbent elects to hold
the latter he must surrender the former: People v. Leonard, 73 Cal.
230 (1887). The state courts will declare a state office vacant
on the acceptance by the incumbent of a Federal office of the prohibited class: Dickson v. People, 17 Ill. 191 (1855) ; People v.
Brooklyn, 77 N. Y, 503 (1879).
WILLS; RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION. In the case of Morse v.
Blood, 71 N. W. 682, Minn. (June 8, 1897), the testator left his
entire property to his wife, "on condition that in no case shall she
give or bequeath one cent of said estate to any member of my
family or any relation of her own."
Though it is generally held
that a condition in restraint of alienation to particular classes of'
persons is good, the court said that such a condition should not be
allowed where it is so vexatious as to prevent any alienation for a
limited time. The effect of such a condition as the above would
be to tie up the real estate during the widow's life, for no purchaser
could safely take it, when it might be forfeited at any time by the
widow giving a drink or other trifling gift to any of the forbidden
persons. And, moreover, if the estate was forfeited by her gift or
devise, it would revert to the testator's heirs, who were the very
persons he desired to exclude. The court therefore held this condition void as being inconsistent with the grant of a fee, and also
as being inconsistent with itself. A provision in almost the same
language, "That my widow shall not will to any of my blood kin
or hers any of the estate," was held void, as inconsistent with the
nature of the estate, in Barnard'sLessee v. Bailey, 2 Har. (Del.)
56 (1835), and in Ludlow v. Bunbuly, 35 Beav. 36 (1865), a
condition made by the wife that if (B.), his wife, or descendants,
acquire any interest, the whole estate of the husband should cease,
was held void.
The rule allowing partial restraints on alienation, is, it must be
remembered, an exception to the general policy of the law and the
principle of the above cases in establishing an exception to that
rule, and returning to the rule of public" policy, seems to be that
such conditions should not be permitted where, though partial, they
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are unreasonable, and have the effect of keeping the estate out of'
the market.
WILLS; REVOCATION BY SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE.
The SupremeCourt of Wisconsin has recently decided, in Lyon v. Cole, 71 N.
W. 362 (May 21, 1897), that under the statutes of Wisconsin,
which give married women the absolute power of disposing of their
property by will, the will of a single woman is not revoked by her
subsequent marriage.
The common law rule was that the will of a man was revoked by
subsequent marriage and birth of issue, but neither circumstance,
standing alone, was sufficient to revoke: Christopherv. Christopher,
Dick. 445 (1771); Doed. White v. Barford, 4 M. & S. 1o
(z815).
But the will of a woman was revoked by marriage alone:
.Forsev. Heinbling, 4 Rep. 6o (1588) ; Hodsden v. Lloyd, 2 Bro.
Ch. 534 (1789).
The reason for this difference was that, in the
case of a man, only such a change in his circumstances as to alter
the course of descent was held sufficient to constitute an implied.
revocation of his will; while, in the case of the woman, marriage,
by destroying her right over her property, destroyed the ambulatory
nature of her previous will. Therefore, the courts held that the
will, being unable to retain one of its essential qualities, must be
revoked by marriage. Where, however, the woman retains the
right to devise during coverture, by ante-nuptial contract, as she
has thereby the right to alter the previous will, she is so far a feme"
sole, and that will is not revoked by her marriage: Stewartv. Afulholland, 88 Ky. 40 (1888).
Following this idea, that the common law rule ceased when the
reason for it ceased, the court, in the case under discussion, said
that since a married woman is now, by statute, in Wisconsin, empowered to will as freely as if she were a man, the law in regard to
the revocation of her will should be the same as it is in the case of'
a man. In other States, where marriage and birth of issue are still
both necessary to revoke a man's will, they have, after the Married
Women's acts, been held equally necessary to revoke a woman's
will: Miller v. Phillips, 9 R. I. 137 (1868) ; Fellovws v. Allen,.
6o N. H. 439 (1881) ; Webb v. Jones, 3 6 N. J. Eq. 163 (1882);
Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich. 173 (1884) ; .Emery, Appellant, 81
Me. 275 (1889); Roane v. Hollingshead, 76 Md. 369 (1892)..
In Re Tuller's Will, 79 Ill. 99 (1875), the court said that the
reason of the rule of implied revocation was that the marriage and
birth of issue, in England, and marriage alone here, change the
course of descent, and that therefore it was generally held in this
country that marriage alone, of a man or woman, was a revocation
of a previous will, as husband and wife are here each other's heirs ;.
but that where the marriage did not alter the course of descent, as
in this case, where the devisees were the children of the first marriage, and therefore heirs, there was no revocation. The same
principle was followed in Re Ward's Will, 70 Wis. 251 (1887),.

